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ARTICLES
AUTONOMY OF MILITARY ROBOTS:
ASSESSING THE TECHNICAL AND
LEGAL (“JUS IN BELLO”) THRESHOLDS
REMUS TITIRIGA, PHD*
PROFESSOR, INHA LAW SCHOOL
SOUTH KOREA

“The claws were bad enough in the first place--nasty, crawling little
death-robots. But when they began to imitate their creators, it was
time for the human race to make peace--if it could!”1
Philip K. Dick, Second Variety

*
Remus Titiriga, PhD, LLM, MSc is professor at INHA Law School in Incheon,
South Korea. With a double background, in Computer engineering and Law, he is fluent
in 3 languages (including English and French). He has almost 7 years of international
teaching experience within French, American, South Korean universities.
He has published a book: La comparaison, technique essentielle du juge européen at L’Harmattan, Paris, France, 2011. Other of his researches, in Legal Methodology, ICT regulation, International Security or International Economic Integration are visible at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1600093.
1. Second Variety, LITHIVE http://lithive.com/books/26.
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ABSTRACT
While robots are still absent from our homes, they have started to
spread over battlefields. However, the military robots of today are mostly remotely controlled platforms, with no real autonomy. This paper
will disclose the obstacles in implementing autonomy for such systems
by answering a technical question: What level of autonomy is needed in
military robots and how and when might it be achieved, followed by a
techno-legal one: How to implement the rules of humanitarian law
within autonomous fighting robots, in order to allow their legal deployment? The first chapter scrutinizes the significance of autonomy in robots and the metrics used to quantify it, which were developed by the
US Department of Defense.
The second chapter focuses on the autonomy of "state-of-the-art”
robots (e.g.; Google’s self-driving car, DARPA’s projects, etc.) for navigation, ISR or lethal missions. Based on public information, we will get a
hint of the architectures, the functioning, the thresholds and technical
limitations of such systems. The bottleneck to a higher autonomy of robots seems to be their poor “perceptive intelligence.”
The last chapter looks to the requirements of humanitarian law
(rules of “jus in bello”/rules of engagement) to the legal deployment of
autonomous lethal robots on the battlefields. The legal and moral reasoning of human soldiers, complying with humanitarian law, is a complex cognitive process which must be emulated by autonomous robots
that could make lethal decisions. However, autonomous completion of
such “moral” tasks by artificial agents is much more challenging than
the autonomous implementation of other tasks, such as navigation, ISR
or kinetic attacks.
Given the limits of current Artificial Intelligence, it is highly unlikely that robots will acquire such moral capabilities anytime soon.
Therefore, for the time being, the autonomous weapon systems might be
legally deployed, but only in very particular circumstances, where the
requirements of humanitarian law happen to be irrelevant.
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I. THE MEANING OF AUTONOMY IN ROBOTS AND WAYS TO
QUANTIFY IT
A) DEFINING AUTONOMY IN ROBOTS

The term “robot” is based on the Czech word “robota,” meaning
“serf or slave,” and came into being in Karel Capek’s 1921 play R.U.R.
(Rosumovi Univerzální Roboti or Rossum’s Universal Robots). Today, a
robot is defined as “a mechanical creature which can function autonomously.”2 This concept of autonomy is correlated but different from automation. While both processes can be executed independently, from
start to finish without human intervention, there is a qualitative distinction between them.
An automated system normally operates with no human intervention, but is not self-directed and lacks decision-making capabilities. It
only replaces routine processes with software/hardware that follows a
step-by-step order, which usually requires human supervision. In a certain way, an automated system is rigid, blind, and, one might say, stupid.
An autonomous system has the aim to emulate human cognitive
processes rather than to simply eliminate them. Therefore, autonomy
requires three main characteristics (which also help to identify whether
a machine is truly autonomous): (1) The “frequency of human operator
interactions” that the machine needs in order to function; (2) The machine’s ability to function successfully despite “environmental uncertainty”; and (3) The machine’s level of assertiveness to each of various
operational decisions that let the machine to complete its mission. 3
An autonomous system may also learn or acquire new knowledge,
such as adopting new methods to accomplish its tasks or adjusting to
changing surroundings. Over the last twenty years there have been
many attempts to identify and quantify the “levels of autonomy” in robots. The degree of autonomy of a robot has been considered, at least in
the beginning, from the viewpoint of human interaction/interface with a
robotic system.
B) SHERIDAN’S LEVELS OF AUTONOMY

During his work for the National Aeronautics and Space Admin2. Robin R. Murphy, Introduction to AI Robotics 2 (2000), reproduced in Benjamin
Kastan, AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS: A COMING LEGAL “SINGULARITY?” 1 J. L. TECH
& POL’Y 45, 49 (2013).
3. William Marra and McNeil, Sonia, Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the
Next Generation of War Machines, 36 HARV, J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2012).
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istration (NASA), Thomas Sheridan created both a categorization and
vocabulary to express the state of human-machine interaction at any
given moment during a mission.4 His classification is structured into
levels and implies that autonomy is a delegation of a complete task to a
computer, that a system operates on a single level of autonomy for any
given task, and that these levels are discrete and represent steps of
growing difficulty. 5
At Level one, a machine is automated. Levels two through four emphasize the allocation of the decision-making capacity between human
and machine. Levels five through nine offer an initial decision-making
power to the machine and confer to human operators special levels of
approval or veto power. At Level 10, a machine is fully autonomous.
Most other tentative classifications for quantifying robots’ autonomy seem to follow the steps of Sheridan’s early work. The United States
Department of Defense (US DOD), for example, has funded a number of
studies about the “levels of autonomy” in robots in order to aid their development.6 Further analysis of these studies is provided in later sections.
C) AIR FORCE RESEARCH LAB SCALE OF AUTONOMY

The Air Force Research Lab (AFRL)’s autonomy frame considers 11
levels of autonomy, specifically for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV):
Remotely piloted vehicle;
Execute pre-planned mission remotely;
Changeable mission;
Robust response to real-time faults/events;
Fault/event adaptive vehicle;
Real-time multi-vehicle coordination;
Real time multi-vehicle cooperation;
Battle space knowledge;
Battle space single cognizance;
Battle space swarm cognizance; and
Fully autonomous7
There is a perspective, common in aviation, to consider the fighter
4.

THOMAS B.

SHERIDAN, TELEROBOTICS, AUTOMATION, AND HUMAN SUPERVISORY

CONTROL (1992).

5.
6.

Id.

DEF. SCI. BD., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DOD SYSTEMS
(July 2012) at 4, available at https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/autonomy.pdf (hereinafter
TASK FORCE REPORT).
7. Eric Sholes, Evolution of a UAV Autonomy Classification Taxonomy, AEROSPACE
CONFERENCE
DIGEST
(2007),
available
at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/
stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=4161585 (on file with author).
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pilots of a plane as acting according to the OODA decision loop. 8 It was
natural to consider the autonomy of UAVs, on the pathway of Sheridan’s view of the interactions between humans and machines, from the
perspective of the OODA loop.9 The greater a machine’s ability to observe, to orient, to decide and to act by its own, the greater its autonomy would be.10
This approach introduces an additional refinement since the machine’s level of autonomy in relation to humans is considered at different phases of the OODA loop. For example, a machine might exhibit
greater autonomy in observing its environment and orienting itself, but
might be dependent on humans at the decision or action stage.
Figure 1: Autonomy Spectrum and the OODA Loop11
In Figure 1 above, which is a subsystem of AFLR scale - developed
horizontally, one can see how a machine might operate at Level 10 at
the observe stage and thus be cognizant of all objects in its environment. However, the machine might only achieve Level 5 at the decide
stage, enabling it to avoid collisions with objects in its environment, but
still needing human assistance to realize more significant objectives.
D) AUTONOMY OF UGV (UNMANNED GROUND VEHICLE) ACCORDING TO
AMERICAN ARMY SCIENCE BOARD

Some other metrics have been developed for measuring the autonomy of UGVs (Unmanned Ground Vehicle).12 In this respect, the most
8. The concept was developed by fighter pilot and strategist John Boyd, for decision-making in air combat. It is called the OODA (observe, orient, decide, act) loop, where:
observe means to collect current information from as many sources as possible; orient
means to analyze the information, and use it to update the current reality; decide means
to determine a course of action; act means to follow through with a decision. FRANS P.B.
OSINGA, SCIENCE, STRATEGY AND WAR: THE STRATEGIC THEORY OF JOHN BOYD, 235 (2006).
9. See Paul Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield Part I: Range, Persistence and
Daring, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY, 13 (2014), available at
http://www.cnas.org/range-persistence-daring (stating that “[m]achines that perform a
function for some period of time, then stop and wait for human input before continuing,
are often referred to as ‘semiautonomous’ or ‘human in the loop.’ Machines that can perform a function entirely on their own but have a human in a monitoring role, with the
ability to intervene if the machine fails or malfunctions, are often referred to as ‘humansupervised autonomous’ or ‘human on the loop.’ Machines that can perform a function entirely on their own and humans are unable to intervene are often referred to as ‘fully autonomous’ or ‘human out of the loop.’”
10. Id, at 18.
11. Marra & McNeil, supra note 3 at 26.
12. See generally Hui-Min Huang, et al., Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems
(ALFUS) Framework, Volume II: Framework Models, NIST Special Publication 1011-II-
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sophisticated initiative was accomplished by the American Army Science Board Study.
Figure 2. Autonomy frame of the Army Science Board Study 13
The observe and orient stages from the AFLR’s OODA loop were
fused into the orient perception/situation awareness stage of this scale,
as seen in Figure 2 above. The matching between the two frames is not
quite one-to-one, but this new scale gives a clear hint of the autonomy
requirements for an UGV.
E) FURTHER REFINEMENTS IN MEASURING AUTONOMY: THE IMPORTANCE OF
COMPLEXITY OF ENVIRONMENT AND TASK

From a close inspection of UAV or UGV metrics, it becomes clear
that the environment in which autonomous systems must operate is
important in establishing the level of autonomy within the corresponding scale. It is intuitively clear that robotic systems operating at sea (or
undersea) are faced with a different and less complex environment than
the robots crossing crowded city roads.
However, a closer look at both metrics reveals another important
issue for the level of autonomy; they both deal with measures of autonomy only in the navigation of specific environments (air or ground). The
autonomous task/mission considered in both cases is the navigational
task. Therefore, it would be meaningless to refer to a machine as “autonomous” or “semi-autonomous” without identifying the relevant task
(mission). In fact, a machine that might be “fully autonomous” for one
task, such as navigation along a route, might be fully human-controlled
for another task, such as gathering information.14 For example, a UAV
might have autonomous control over its flight path, but it might only be
remotely operated for firing a missile to an enemy—the human operator
would retain the absolute control of when and at whom to fire (the kinetic attack task). In conclusion, the task/mission should be considered
as well in creating an inclusive frame for levels of autonomy in robots.
Huang attempted to develop a more complete framework and metrics for robot autonomy by taking into account all three dimensions: (1)
Human interaction/interface; (2) Task/mission complexity; (3) Environmental difficulty.15 According to this framework, the robot’s autonomy
must be determined by levels on three axes as depicted below (Figure

1.0 Version 1.0 (2007), available at http://www.nist.gov/el/isd/ks/upload/ALFUS-BG.pdf.
13. Id. at 28.
14. Scharre, supra note 9 at 13.
15. Huang, et al., supra note 12 at 7.
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3).
Figure 3. Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) model
of autonomy16
For example, the environmental complexity axis in Figure 3 takes
into account the environmental difficulty in measuring the autonomy. It
would be a huge difference between navigating an unstructured but
static environment such as a desert crossing, versus a dynamic but
structured environment such as city roads. An added difficulty would be
encountered in environments where maps provide little guidance or
where both cooperative and hostile agents proliferate. The model developed by Huang is a clear advancement because it clarifies the multidimensional nature of autonomy. However, the authors have yet to determine exactly how to compute a general autonomy level (i.e., by determining the average of the scores along each of the axes).
A recent Final Report of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task
Force, regarding the role of autonomy, questions the whole effort by
recognizing that:
[…] many of the DoD–funded studies on ‘levels of autonomy’...are not
particularly helpful to the autonomy design process. These taxonomies
are misleading…Cognitively, system autonomy is a continuum from
complete human control of all decisions to situations where many
functions are delegated to the computer with only high-level supervision and/or oversight from its operator. Multiple concurrent functions
may be needed to evince a desired capability, and subsets of functions
may require a human in the loop, while other functions can be delegated at the same time. Thus, at any stage of a mission, it is possible
for a system to be in more than one discrete level simultaneously.17

One must agree with the ideas of the study. However, our goal is to understand the challenges and the thresholds for implementing autonomy
within robots. To achieve that, by a qualitative assessment of performances in “state-of-the-art” (military) robots, the metrics developed by
the DoD are indispensable.
The next chapter will start this analysis in relation to autonomous
navigation. The results will allow an extrapolation for autonomous performances required from robots executing more challenging tasks, such
as ISR missions or lethal missions.

16.
17.

Id, at 23.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6 at 13.
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE TECHNICAL THRESHOLDS FOR
IMPLEMENTING AUTONOMY IN MILITARY ROBOTS
1. UGV AS ROBOT NAVIGATING THE URBAN ROADS: THE CASE OF GOOGLE’S
SELF DRIVING CAR

There is little information about the architecture of Google’s selfdriving car, but certain elements might be gathered from the history of
the project. Its origins are in DARPA’s Challenges, two major US competitions leading to the development of autonomous ground vehicles.
The 2005 Grand Challenge required autonomous vehicles to crosssections of California’s Mojave Desert.18 The vehicles were provided
with GPS coordinates of way-points along the path, while the terrain
was completely unknown to the designers, and the vehicles moved autonomously at speeds of 20 to 30 mph. 19 In 2007, the Urban Challenge
required autonomous vehicles to travel in a simulated urban environment (a mock city at George Air Force base in Victorville, California), in
the presence of other vehicles and signal lights, while complying with
traffic laws.20
The winner of the latter race was Carnegie Mellon’s team, led by
Chris Urmson, followed by Stanford’s team, led by Sebastian Thrun. 21
Thrun was the initiator of Google’s car project and was later replaced by
Urmson, who is still its leader today.22 It could be reasonably presumed
that the initial project was largely inspired by Stanford’s competition
car.23
a) The decision steps of Google’s car during urban driving
Google’s car software architecture is designed as a data-driven
pipeline in which individual modules process information asynchronously. The time delay between entries of sensor data into the pipeline
to a vehicle’s actuators is approximately 300ms.
Google’s car might follow through six steps in its driving decisions
on urban roads.24 The first step for the car is to locate itself. 25 The on18. THE DARPA URBAN CHALLENGE: AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES IN CITY TRAFFIC, 307
(Martin Buehler et all eds., 2009).
19. Id. at 233.
20. Id. at 651.
21. Driven to Innovate, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY, (last visited Nov. 14, 2015),
www.cmu.edu/homepage/computing/2010/fall/driven-to-innovate.shtml
22. Id.
23. See Id.
24. See Eric Jaffe, The First Look at How Google's Self-Driving Car Handles City
Streets,
THE
ATLANTIC
CITY
LAB
(Apr.
28,
2014),
http://www.citylab.com/tech/2014/04/first-look-how-googles-self-driving-car-handles-city-
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board computer of the car collects sensor data from radar, lasers, and
cameras, and integrates them to orient itself in the world via GPS, and
in the streets with special embedded 3D maps.26 These maps are 3D digitizations of the physical world, including extremely small details like
the position and the precise height of every curb, traffic sign,
etc. Special Google teams travel in advance and pre-scan the roads that
the car will travel and then create these 3D maps.27
In the next step, the car determines the obstacles on the road. 28 The
car collects sensor information from its radar, lasers, and cameras.
Based on this data (and after comparing it with the 3D map), the vehicle determines and identifies the obstacles in urban environments as
static obstacles or moving obstacles.29
In the third step, the car "classif[ies] this information as actual objects that might have an impact on the car's route — other cars, pedestrians, cyclists, etc. — and to estimate their size, speed, and trajectory."30 Technological advancements in machine vision (in relation to deep
learning algorithms based on artificial neural networks) have facilitated the car's ability to classify the objects around it.31 While in the beginning it was difficult to distinguish a car from a pedestrian, the system is
now able to make the difference.32
In the next step, the information enters into a probabilistic prediction model which evaluates what these objects are doing now and estimates what they will do next.33 The prediction is based, mostly, on consistent constraints for objects, which are located on the road. For
example, at every intersection where a driver has choices for changing
lanes, several hypotheses are created. Whereas some drivers’ behavior
could be easily described and programmed, the engineers also allow the
car to learn from other drivers’ behavior.
The great technological advancement which allowed Google’s car to
drive on urban roads relates to machine learning; this learning is the

streets/8977/ (showing the 6 steps taken from a comprehensive description of the system
made in The six steps were taken from a comprehensive description of the system).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Eric Jaffe, The First Look at How Google's Self-Driving Car Handles City
Streets,
THE
ATLANTIC
CITY
LAB
(Apr.
28,
2014),
http://www.citylab.com/tech/2014/04/first-look-how-googles-self-driving-car-handles-citystreets/8977/
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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ability of computer systems to interpret data and to solve problems on
their own.34 Google likely uses machine learning algorithms with some
reinforced learning to create models of people or vehicles on the road.
The machine learning process may be equally accomplished within virtual simulations of street traffic. 35 The engineers can even register circumstances when the human driver turned off the autonomous driving
and determine what would have happened if the car had acted alone. 36
b) The (real) autonomy level of Google’s car and its meaning
Although Google’s car could be considered at Level 7 of autonomy—
on the scale for UGV, developed by American Army Science Board
Study (see figure 2)—a deep assessment of the car’s abilities would lower its autonomy to Level 5, at most. In fact, the false higher autonomy
level is linked to the “ruse” of using the 3D pre-scanned maps.37
While all autonomous cars of today rely on basic electronic maps for
navigation and lane-centering, Google’s car uses, as we have seen, far
more detailed 3D maps. The combination of GPS with the fine aligned
3D pre-scanned maps lowers tremendously the needed performance in
“perceptual processing” of data about urban environment, since the car
does not need to process entire surrounding scenes from scratch. 38
Metaphorically speaking, the need to “understand/recognize” the
world’s elements just disappears for Google’s car. Its “perceptual34. Alexis C. Madrigal, The Trick that Makes Google's Self-Driving Cars Work, THE
ATLANTIC (May 15 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/05/all-theworld-a-track-the-trick-that-makes-googles-self-driving-cars-work/370871/
35. Google has re-built the complete California 172,000-mile road system in its
software, including accurate simulations of weather, traffic, pedestrians, etc. Sebastian
Anthony, Google has built a Matrix-like simulation of California to test its self-driving
cars, EXTREMETECH (August 22, 2014), http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/188482google-has-built-a-matrix-like-simulation-of-california-to-test-its-self-driving-cars.
36. Alexis C. Madrigal, supra note 34.
37. Lee Gomes, Urban jungle a tough challenge for Google’s autonomous cars, MIT
TECHNOLOGY
REVIEW
(July
24,
2014),
available
at:
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/529466/urban-jungle-a-tough-challenge-forgoogles-autonomous-cars/.
38. See Comment to How do Google’s self-driving cars work?,QUORA (Jul. 13, 2011),
http://www.quora.com/How-do-Googles-self-driving-cars-workSee (stating that “[…] laser
sensors are used to create a 3d point cloud of the surroundings. In this scan it is actually
quite easy to extract lane markers due to the fact that lane markers produce a higher intensity value in the laser scan. In addition to the lane detection they also have the ability
to do full alignment of the point clouds. In order to do this they first drive through a patch
of road collecting point cloud of the surroundings for many successive frames. These point
clouds are then aligned algorithmically[.] This creates a full 3d model of that patch of road
and you can then align the 3d model to satellite imagery. […] [W]hen they drive through
that road again they can take the [new] laser scan and align the scan to the existing 3d
model to find and estimate where they are also[.]”; see also Madrigal, supra note 34.
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visual”39 processing system should not deal with the complexity of surroundings (traffic markings, trees, different obstacles, etc.). It will only
detect and process data about "new" elements-obstacles, which do not
appear on the 3D map.40
As such, the system has clear limitations.41 The most important one
is the use of “brute (computing) force” to circumvent its blindness.
Therefore, it is difficult to imagine it as being scaled up to cover the entire world. However, we could try a thinking experiment: to attempt to
3D pre-scan all the roads of the world. Google’s street view project, multiplied by tens of thousands, gives us a hint of the magnitude of required effort.
Furthermore, if the robots will enter our homes to make deliveries
or to execute menial tasks, for example, they will need finer and higher
resolution 3D maps of the inside of all the buildings.
With this approach, the robots will become autonomous only if we
can get an almost perfect and systematically updated virtual copy of the
real world. Perhaps the solution is to give any object of the future significant deep 3D mapping abilities. These objects will do the “hard work.”
The Tango program of Google, which integrates 3D scan abilities to
smart phones, is just a small step in that direction.42
However, this sort of highly regular, geometrical, and artificial virtual copy might exist as long as the real world lives in peace. The war,
by its very own nature, is “fog”: uncertainty, disruptions, and destructions that will instantly turn off such a highly detailed virtual copy of
the world.43 Military robots cannot rely on this approach and must find
another pathway toward autonomy.

39.

This is only a metaphor, since the main sensor of the car is a laser (LIDAR).
See Alexei Oreskovic, Silicon Valley debate on self-driving cars: do you need a
map?, REUTERS (March 6, 2015),http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/06/us-autosselfdriving-technology-analysis-idUSKBN0M20EK20150306)(stating that “[t]he mapbased approach allows you to drive accurately in a controlled environment, where you
know that things don’t change much[.]”
41. The existing 3D maps, the know-how and tremendous resources provide Google
with an obvious advantage. However, these 3D maps can easily become obsolete if, for example, fresh fallen snow or even rain might change the landscape. And if a traffic light, a
stop sign or an intersection has changed, even slightly, the database of 3D maps must be
updated too. Id.
42. The "Project Tango" prototype is an Android smartphone-like device that tracks
the 3D motion of the device, and creates a 3D model of the environment around it. About
Project Tango, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/atap/project-tango/about-project-tango/
(last visited August 3, 2015).
43. BARRY D. WATTS, CLAUSEWITZIAN FRICTION AND FUTURE WAR, INSTITUTE FOR
NATIONAL
STRATEGIC
STUDIES,
1-2
(2004),
available
at
http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Watts-Friction3.pdf
40.
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c) The significance of Google’s car limitations for military UGV
navigation: the restrictions in visual intelligence of robots
We have seen that Google’s car navigates in the dynamic but structured environment of urban roads. We have also discovered that
Google’s car, as a state-of-the-art system, does not have the perception
or situational awareness to operate by itself in such an environment. It
can only overcome this threshold by combining the navigation based on
GPS with the pre-scanned highly detailed 3D maps.
The autonomous navigation requirements of a military UGV, an
autonomous military truck, for example, are much greater than those of
Google’s car. Most of the time, military UGVs operate in environments
that are both highly dynamic and structured/unstructured, where existing maps provide little guidance; where its GPS is not always accessible
because of the jamming or decoy; and where hostile agents are highly
active. A military UGV could not use any pre-scanned 3D maps and
might, eventually, rely on inertial navigation. Given the limitations of
Google’s “state-of-the-art” perceptual intelligence, it must be clear that
today’s military UGV are not up to the (navigational) task. 44
Experts confirm that “UGV navigation in urban environments, in
dense foliage, off road and with people remains nascent” since there is a
“lack of high-speed obstacle detection in complex terrain.”45 Where
“these specialized range sensors permit rapid identification of surfaces
for navigation, it is not sufficient to permit the UGV to determine the
difference between…a bush that it can run over, tall weeds that indicate a drop off into a creek bed underneath, and the presence of a rock
among the weeds that would damage it.” 46 In fact, the actual systems
are far from the visual abilities of birds or even flying insects which are
able to perform well without using predetermined waypoints or an external position reference system.
As seen previously, in relation to GPS waypoints and 3D maps,
Google’s self-driving car relies on range sensors and laser scans
(LIDAR) to navigate.47 The visual processing is realized only during the
later stage of driving decision, when the car must differentiate categories of mobile obstacles (cars, bicycles, passengers, etc.). That was the
only solution since the visual systems of today are only classificatory
systems48 with no deep field vision. Their performances are far behind
44. For example, a Carnegie Mellon’s car, which used only visual navigation system,
required sensors mounted on street lights to make its 2013 autonomous journey to the
airport, not on the urban roads. Oreskovic, supra note 40.
45. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6 at 37.
46. Id.
47. Jaffe, supra note 24.
48. “What people are doing today in computer vision isn’t really vision—they’re do-
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those of their biological counterparts.49
This current limitation of “visual intelligence” in the autonomous
navigation systems is indirectly acknowledged by a recent DARPA announcement of a Fast Lightweight Autonomy (FLA) program. 50 This
four-year program tries to give small UAVs (without GPS) the abilities
of birds or flying insects that navigate at high speeds in cluttered environments.51 It investigates software approaches that will enable revolutionary improvements to state of the art visual processing; such improvements include perception approaches such as rapid evaluation and
recognition of previously visited areas using landmark recognition, and
algorithms to localize and navigate relative landmarks or other visually
distinctive features. 52 If successful, the developed algorithms could impact a wide range of unmanned systems in navigation through cluttered
environments (such as a UGV in a city).
More important scientific breakthroughs in visual intelligence
would be necessary to provide the robots with “humanlike” navigation
abilities. This is the idea of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects
Activity (IARPA), which recently announced MICRONS, a program trying to reverse-engineer human brain algorithms in sensory information
processing.53
IARPA seeks to significantly improve artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies since “today’s state of the art algorithms are
brittle and do not generalize well […][while] in contrast, the brain is
able to robustly separate and categorize signals in the presence of significant noise and non-linear transformations, and can extrapolate from
single examples to entire classes of stimuli.” 54 The MICRONS program
is based on “targeted neuroscience experiments that interrogate the oping image classification. That’s a subset of vision. ‘Here’s an image; what is it?’ Caleb Garling,
Jeff
Hawkins
on
Firing
up
the
Silicon
Brain,
WIRED,
http://www.wired.com/2015/05/jeff-hawkins-firing-silicon-brain/, (last visited June 5,
2015).
49. Very complex mechanisms are implicated in insects’ navigation. Bees possess a
mechanism for learning the solar ephemeris (the position of the sun in the sky) for the
time of day, as measured by an internal clock of some sort. They have also mechanisms
for dead reckoning, which requires the integration of two types of information (direction
and speed). In this case it is the ‘visual flow’ that seems to be used as the measure of distance travelled. PETER CARRUTHERS, THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE MIND, 96 (2006).
50. Fast Lightweight Autonomy (FLA), FEDERAL BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES, availa-

ble

at

http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/DSO/Programs/Fast_Lightweight_Autonomy_%28FLA%
29.aspx, (last visited April 18, 2015)
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Machine Intelligence from Cortical Networks (MICrONS), IARPA,
http://www.iarpa.gov/index.php/research-programs/microns (last visited April 18, 2015).
54. Id.
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eration of mesoscale cortical computing circuits, taking advantage of
emerging tools for high-resolution structural and functional brain mapping.”55
This program has the potential to significantly advance the visual
intelligence of robots. However, at this time, the complete success of
both DARPA and IARPA initiatives is uncertain.
In conclusion, the military UGVs’ ability to navigate the dynamic
but structured environments of urban roads does not exist today, or in
the foreseeable future, due to limitations in perceptual and visual intelligence of robots. Nevertheless, one may still assess the autonomous
navigation in other possible settings, of (slightly) structured and/or static environments. Such spaces were the perceptual and visual processing
is less needed might be found during navigation on the sea (or undersea) or in navigation through air. Intuitively, a robotic system with the
current capabilities of Google’s car would be able to autonomously navigate in such environments.
2. TOWARD AUTONOMOUS NAVIGATION IN OTHER UXV
a) The first real autonomous UMV: the ACTUV
DARPA financed the development of the Anti-Submarine Warfare
Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV), an unmanned maritime
vehicle (UMV), optimized to track the most quiet diesel electric submarines.56
Certain countries use cheap diesel-electric submarines as antiaccess/access-denial (AA/AD) components against US carriers. 57 With
ACTUV, the US Navy will be equipped with an anti-submarine detection system (an autonomous submarine “hunter”), which will be much
cheaper than any diesel submarine.58
This program integrates highly autonomous (with light remote supervisory control) navigational tasks within missions spanning a range
of thousands of kilometers and for months in duration. 59 It includes autonomous compliance with maritime laws and conventions for safe navigation, autonomous system management for operational reliability,
55.
56.

Id.
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV)
"Sea Hunter," NAVAL DRONES, http://www.navaldrones.com/ACTUV.html (last visited
April 18, 2015); Tamir Eshel, Autonomous ASW: The Predator Becoming a Prey, DEFENSE
UPDATE
(Jan
1,
2013),
http://defenseupdate.com/20130101_saic_develops_an_unmanned_submarine_hunter.html.
57. Anti-Submarine Warfare, supra note 56.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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and even autonomous interaction with an intelligent adversary.60
Besides its autonomous navigation tasks, the ACTUV employs nonconventional sensor technologies for autonomous ISR (Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), allowing it to track the submarines
over their entire operating activity, even by following them into harbors.61
DARPA allowed Leidos, a national security, health, and engineering company, to build a mock-up ACTUV as a “Trimaran” made of carbon composites and equipped with navigation and piloting sensors, electro-optics, and long/short-range radar.62
b) Toward navigation autonomy in UAVs
The most common UAVs today reveal characteristics both of automation and autonomy. For instance, “the Global Hawk reconnaissance
drone has the ability to take off and land unassisted.”63 For other functions, the human operator can choose among different levels of autonomy.64 These systems are at Level 0, or at most 1, on the AFLR’s autonomy scale.65
However, some state of the art systems might reach higher autonomy levels. Since the air is a less complex environment than the one
Google’s car must navigate through, highly autonomous navigation
seems attainable by today’s most advanced UAVs.
That is the case for BAE System Taranis, a British demonstrator
program, which, in addition to radar invisibility, includes artificial intelligence and high levels of autonomy.66 The system showed its capacity to autonomously take off, navigate to the target, detect a target, generate a plan for flying to the target, search for it, and then return to
base.67 It relies on onboard electronic maps to identify a target's position
when GPS signals are jammed.68 The vehicle also carried out simulated
attacks and post-attacks damage assessment.69
Another highly autonomous system is the Northrop Grumman X60. Id.
61. Id.
62. On November 18, 2014, Leidos announced that a test of a surrogate vessel mimicking the final configuration of the ACTUV, completed 42 days of at-sea demonstrations
to fulfil collision regulations. Id.
63. Marra & McNeil, supra note 3 at 28.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. What we do, BAE SYSTEMS, http://www.baesystems.com/en/product/taranis (last
visited Apr. 18, 2015).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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47B,70 which is designed for carrier-based operations. Developed under
DARPA's supervision, as part of the United States Navy's Unmanned
Combat Air System Demonstration (UCAS-D) program, it has successfully performed a series of land-based and carrier-based demonstrations.71 Both of these systems are, at most, at Level 5 on the AFLR autonomy scale.
3. THE SEARCH FOR AUTONOMY IN ISR (INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE
AND RECONNAISSANCE) FOR UXV
a) UMVs
As seen previously, certain UMVs with autonomous navigation capabilities are able to autonomously track the quietest diesel submarines
over their entire operating envelope. Therefore, ACTUV will necessarily
have high autonomous ISR capacities in relation to its main mission.
However, the ISR capabilities required for discovering and discriminating targets within an undersea environment are far lower than those
required, for instance, in a city environment. This illustrates the current feasibility of this project.
b) UAVs
In the case of UAVs, the ground ISR’s requirements for a plane are
far greater. However, promising work has been done in human interaction with computer vision processing, allowing the reduction of manpower and cognitive workload in ISR missions. 72
The automatic/autonomous ground-based surveillance is the goal of DARPA’s
programs such as Gorgon Stare, Argus-IS,73 and Mind’s Eye.74
70. X-47B UCAS Makes Aviation History…Again!, NORHTROP GRUNMAN,
http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/X47BUCAS/Pages/default.aspx, (last visited April 18, 2015).
71. Id.
72. For the manpower requirements of the system. See Mark Thompson, Manning
Unmanned Systems, TIME (Sept. 10, 2012), http://nation.time.com/2012/09/10/manningunmanned-systems/.
73. The ARGUS-IS (Autonomous Real-Time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance Imaging System) is an advanced camera system that uses hundreds of cell phone cameras in a
mosaic, to video and auto-track every moving object within an area. Damien Gayle, The

incredible U.S. military spy drone that's so powerful it can see what type of phone you're
carrying
from
17,500ft,
DAILYMAIL
(Jan.
28,
2013),

www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2269563/The-U-S-militarys-real-time-GoogleStreet-View-Airborne-spy-camera-track-entire-city-1-800MP.html.
74. "The DARPA Mind’s Eye program seeks to develop in machines a capability that
currently exists only in animals: visual intelligence. In particular, this program pursues
the capability to learn generally applicable and generative representations of action be-
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The Mind’s Eye project attempts to analyze images with software
capable of recognizing human activities in videos and elaborating predictions.75 It is possible that the system “translates” certain tactically
significant actions detected from the air (by Gorgon Stare and Argus-IS
systems) in tags brought to the attention of human operators.
Given the limits of today’s computer visual intelligence, for example, with Google’s car, it is obvious that such ground ISR systems will
have “the man in the loop,” and will remain, at most, semi-autonomous.
4. TOWARD UXVS AS AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS (AWS)
a) UMVs as AWS
We have seen that ACTUV will be an autonomous UMV, both in
maritime navigation and in tracking the quietest diesel submarines.
Adding a lethal autonomous mission to such a submarine hunter will
transform it into an autonomous submarine destroyer, a truly Autonomous Weapon System. From a technical viewpoint and given the actual
limitation in state-of-the art systems, such a step seems easy to accomplish and might be achieved within the foreseeable future.
b) UAVs as AWS
The current UAVs are not autonomous in the firing of weapons because their weapons are always fired in real-time by human controllers.
Presently, there are no known plans or reasons to take the human element out of the weapons firing loop.
However, there is a real need for armed and autonomous UAV or
UCAV (Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles). 76 In the Western Pacific, there
is a build-up of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities based on
diesel submarines (as already mentioned), on missiles, communications
jamming, cyber-warfare tools, or anti-satellite weapons.77 Among them,
the anti-ship cruise or ballistic missiles may force the US Navy’s airtween objects in a scene, directly from visual inputs, and then reason over those learned
representation". H.L.H. de Penning, et al., A Neural-Symbolic Cognitive Agent with a
Mind’s
Eye
(2012),
available
at
https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/WS/AAAIW12/paper/viewFile/5265/5652
75. Id.
76. For a compelling analysis of future naval conflicts, see Andrew F. Krepinevich,
Maritime Competition in a Mature Precision-Strike Regime (April 13, 2015), available at
http://csbaonline.org/publications/2015/04/maritime-competition-in-a-mature-precisionstrike-regime/.
77. Dave Majumdar, Essay: The Legal and Moral Problems of Autonomous Strike
Aircraft, USNI NEWS (Aug. 21, 2014), news.usni.org/2014/08/21/essay-legal-moralproblems-autonomous-strike-aircraft.
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craft carriers to stand a great distance (more than 1,000 nautical miles)
from an enemy’s seacoast.78 In this scenario, the existing (manned)
stealth aircrafts may not have the range or the survivability required to
operate within this space.79
One option for the US Navy is to develop a long-range unmanned
strike aircraft with stealth technology capable of penetrating the thickest of enemy’s air defenses. Since an advanced enemy might deny or degrade communications through jamming and decoys, such an aircraft
must be fully autonomous. It should navigate independently of communications with human controllers and should detect and make decisions
to release weapons without long distance consent by a human. This explains the need for the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Surveillance and
Strike (UCLASS) program.80 In one of its versions, still under discussion,81 the UCLASS aircraft would be an UCAV with air–ground/sea attack capabilities. We will examine the necessary autonomous performance of such UCAV in relation to state-of-the-art robots’ abilities.
Such an aircraft requires defensive capacities against surface-to-air
missiles that might be encountered. In a normal combat plane, human
pilots decide whether to engage this kind of threat. 82 However, human
pilots make this decision based on sensor information processed by the
aircraft’s computers. The Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor or F-35 Joint
Strike Fighter both illustrate this concept primarily in beyond visual
range air-to-air combat.83 Both planes join data from the aircraft’s sensors into a trail file that the computer identifies as hostile, friendly, or
unknown.84 Hence, the pilot is entirely reliant on computers to establish
the appropriate combat identification. It might be just a small technological step to let such a system engage targets autonomously, with no
human intervention.
The next step would be to build an UCAV capable of autonomously

78.
79.

Id.
Id.

80. Unmanned Carrier Launched Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) Program,
www.navaldrones.com/UCLASS.html, (last visitied Nov. 24, 2015). Certain UAV systems,
such as the BAE Taranis and Northrop Grumman X-47B, from the autonomous navigation perspective, seem to attain such performnces as (semi) autonomous weapon systems.
81. There are two competing ideas for UCLASS: a semi-stealthy aircraft with sufficient endurance to operate within normal carrier air wing operations, provide ISR and
light strike in lightly contested environments; and a more capable aircraft with air-to-air
refuelling capability designed to operate in denied airspace for penetrating surveillance
and strike missions. Id.
82. Majumdar, supra note 77.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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engaging an enemy’s combat aircrafts. 85 In a recent article, Air & Space
Power Journal, U.S. Air Force Captain Michael Byrnes defends the idea
of a future unmanned autonomous air-to-air fighter, called the FQ-X. 86
Byrnes’ opinion is based on the suggestion that air-to-air combat presents an extremely “sterile” environment, while acquiring and processing the data against a relatively empty background, the sky, is rather simple.87
We discover, again, the inverse correlation between environmental
simplicity and the level of autonomy attainable for a given task in stateof-the-art robotic systems. Intuitively, the environment in visual air-toair combat is not more complex than that of Google’s car navigation of
urban streets. The moving obstacles and 3D liberty movements of UAVs
require certain technical capabilities. But the use of machine learning
algorithms in simulated combat environments may be a few steps
ahead of the technological advancements seen in Google’s car. This is
why such a UCAV in air-to–air engagements appears to be attainable.
The air-to-ground arena appears much more challenging.88 Besides
target location requirements or enemy camouflage, there are difficulties
in “acquiring and processing sensor data against […] a cluttered backdrop of the Earth’s surface and all of the natural and manmade objects
layered upon it” because this “[s]urface attack is […] extremely context
dependent.”89
This complex environment requires certain ISR high abilities and
the sort of perceptual-visual intelligence that, as we saw already, is still
out of reach for foreseeable technologies. However, one can imagine
ground/sea environments less complex than those of cities; for example,
the visuals over the sea or over the seashores. This reduced environment complexity would lower the necessary perceptive-visual intelligence from UCAVs with autonomous air-to-ground/sea attack capabilities.
Given these restrictions, the first autonomous UCAV will most likely be a stealth UAV with certain ISR capabilities. The following step
might be reached by a UCAV with air-to-air combat abilities. Most likely, the initial UCAV with autonomous air-to-ground attack capacity will
be initially used for anti-ship and subsequently for anti-shore combat
missions. In brief, the implementation of the UCLASS program, as a
85. In air-to-air combat an UAV might have a tactical advantage since certain manoeuvres are impossible for human pilots, given the multiple G limiting factor.
86. Michael W. Byrnes, Nightfall machine autonomy in air-to-air combat, AIR &
SPACE POWER JOURNAL, (May–June 2014), 71, note 30, available at
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/articles/2014-May-Jun/F-Byrnes.pdf.
87. Id.
88. Majumdar, supra note 77.
89. Byrnes, supra note 86.
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highly able UCAV option, requires substantial effort, but it is within
today’s technological reach.
However, in addition to these technological hurdles, there are legal
and ethical barriers for the implementation of autonomous combat missions by the robots. Taking the man “out of the (lethal) decision loop”
obliges such autonomous weapon system (AWS) to follow the rules of
humanitarian law on the battlefields. The next part of the paper will
evaluate this final threshold from a techno-legal angle.90

III. THE LAST TECHNO-LEGAL THRESHOLD FOR AUTONOMY IN
COMBAT MISSIONS: THE AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS
MUST COMPLY WITH RULES OF HUMANITARIAN LAW
Another great obstacle for deploying autonomous weapon systems
(AWS) on the battlefields is the compulsory legal and ethical requirements of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and Rules of Engagement
(ROE).91
The LOAC contains two distinct rules of law: weapons law and targeting law. While the former embraces the rules about weapon as being
lawful per se,92 the latter includes the prohibited use of the weapons
system and will be considered bellow.
1. THE MAIN LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF TARGETING LAW
The four classic cumulative requirements of targeting law are military necessity, discrimination/distinction, proportionality, and humanity.93
a) Military necessity
While military necessity is mentioned in many LOAC treaties, it
arises primarily from customary international law. It appears in the re-

90. For a deep analysis about legal implications of autonomous robots see Kenneth
Anderson & Matthew, C. Waxman, Law and ethics for Autonomous Weapon Systems:
Why a Ban Won’t Work and How the Laws of War Can, JEAN PERKINS TASK FORCE ON
NAT’L SEC. AND L. (2013).
91. The Rules of Engagement (ROE), prescribe more exactly what is acceptable or
not on the battlefield. For a comprehensive discussion of ROE, see GARY, D SOLIS, THE
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICTS. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR, CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 490-512 (2010).
92. For a complete discussion see Chapter 20. General Principles on the Use of
Weapons, ICRC, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter20, (last visited May 2, 2015).
93. Gary, D Solis, supra note 91 at 250-85.
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quirement that one may target things which are not prohibited by
LOAC (military objective such as persons, places, objects, etc.) and
which make an effective contribution to military action. The destruction
of enemy forces and material would generally meet this test.
b) Distinction/discrimination
The distinction/discrimination is another leading principle of the
LOAC. Reflecting customary international law, the distinction requires
a military to differentiate between combatants and civilians, as well as
between military and civilian objects. This rule is codified in Article 48
of Additional Geneva Protocol I with complementary rules in Articles 51
and 52.94
c) Proportionality
The next targeting law precondition/principle is proportionality.
Proportionality requires combatants to examine whether the probable
collateral damage in the attack would be excessive compared to the expected military advantage. This principle is a custom of international
law, and is codified in both Article 51(5)(b) and Article 57(2) (iii) of the
Additional Protocol I of Geneva95 relative to “an attack which may be
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”96
d) Humanity
Customary in nature and codified in Article 57 of Additional Protocol I, the humanity precondition requires an attacker to exercise “con94. Article 51(2): The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians,
shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which
is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited; Article 52(1): Civilian
objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I), art. 51(2), (1977); PROTOCOL
ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND RELATING TO THE
PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL I), art. 52(1),
(1977).
95. Id.
96. At the core of the rule of proportionality lies the standard of ‘excessiveness’
which is “the product of a case-by-case assessment that is evaluated in terms of its reasonableness given the attendant circumstances”. N. Schmitt, Jeffrey S. Thurnher Out of
the loop: autonomous weapon systems and the law of armed conflict, 4 HARVARD
NATIONAL SECURITY JOURNAL 231, 255 (on file with author).
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stant care…to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”97 More exactly, the attacker is required to “do everything feasible
to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects, and are not subject to special protection but are military objectives”; to cancel an attack if it becomes apparent that the rule of proportionality will be breached; to provide “effective advance warning” of
an attack if it may affect the civilian population “unless circumstances
do not permit”; or “[w]hen a choice is possible between several military
objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, [select] that the
attack on which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian
lives and to civilian objects”; and to “take all feasible precautions in the
choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in
any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects.”98
2. THE FIRST TENTATIVE PLAN FOR CREATING MORAL ARTIFICIAL AGENTS
ON BATTLEFIELDS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

a) Pr. Arkin’s general architecture
Ronald Arkin, a professor of Robotics at Georgia Tech University,
conducted one of the most important researches in this field. In 2009, he
published Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots, 99 a book
about designing an artificial moral agent (a robot), capable of matching
or surpassing the standard in applying the rules of LOAC/ROE that we
expect from human soldiers within all battlefield circumstances or operational environments.
After examining the deontological or Kantian ethical theories, utilitarian theories, cultural relativism, virtue ethics, etc., he finally considered the deontological logic as a primary source for implementing the
rules of LOAC/ROE in his robotic system. 100
The most important part in Arkin’s general architecture was the
ethical governor which enclosed algorithms for determining if lethal actions are ethical/legal or not. It addressed in its decision flow the issues
of military necessity, target discrimination, proportionality, and the application of the Principle of Double Intention (the acting in ways which
97. PROTOCOL I, art. 57(1).
98. The essence of the verification obligation is the term “feasible” with the meaning
of “practicable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the
time, including humanitarian and military considerations.” Schmitt, supra note 96 at 259261.
99. See generally RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS
ROBOTS (2009).
100. See generally id.
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would minimize civilian collateral damage).
b) General evaluation of Professor Arkin’s project
The thresholds for the actual implementation of such general moral/ethical architecture seem to be tremendous and are located on different levels. In fact, his design was only a blueprint for a system with no
direct access to the real world through sensors. Authors, such as Professor Sharkey,101 considered it as just a “back-end system,” based on information received from systems expected to be developed sometime in
the future.
According to Professor Arkin himself, the translation of legal principles/rules into algorithm-compatible forms has not been accomplished
yet.102 However, we think that real difficulties lay at another level, the
level of applying the rules of LOAC by a robot (if they will be, if ever,
machine-ready) to particular circumstances.103 To realize that, a robot
must emulate the performance achieved in applying LOAC rules by
human soldiers. This application by human soldiers creates a multidimensional challenge that will be analyzed below.
3. COGNITIVE AND MORAL PROCESSES IN HUMAN COMBATANTS APPLYING
THE PRINCIPLES OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROPORTIONALITY OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW

a) Exploring the multiple difficulties in applying LOAC rules to a given
case by humans
According to classic legal theory, the application of (legal) rules to
facts implies both the qualification of facts and the interpretation of
rules. The problem of qualification of facts occurs when the circumstances of a case are covered by the factual part of rules. It is at this
level that the discrimination/distinction requirements of LOAC will be
applied.
The problem of interpretation appears when a rule is obscure and
has various meanings. This is almost always the case in law, since legal
101. Noel E. Sharkey, The Evitability of Autonomous Robot Warfare, INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, 790 (2012).
102. One might question if such effort will ever bear its fruits. See for a discussion
Benjamin Kastan, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal “Singularity?” 1 J. L.
TECH & POL’Y 45 (2013).
103. See the remarks of Pr.Sharkey: “[the system] has no direct access to the real
world through sensors or a vision system…There is neither a method for interpreting how
the precepts of the laws of war apply in particular contexts nor is there any method for
resolving the ambiguities of conflicting laws in novel situations”, Sharkey, supra note 101
at 790.
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imperatives are made in natural, everyday language. A different problem appears when legal rules contain standards (such as reasonableness, fairness, good faith, etc.) which, as concepts linked to social reality
of a given space or time, are highly context dependent.
The rules of LOAC have all of these characteristics, since they are
very often obscure and contain many standards. More than that, the
rules of LOAC contain legal balances of proportionality (as expressed by
the preconditions-principles of proportionality and humanity) . In general, the reasoning with the balance of proportionality is very context
dependent and is among the most complex in the legal thinking. 104
All of the above problems in applying the rules of LOAC to a case
are part of a hermeneutical process, which, while applied by the courts
(for example, in the post factum context of establishing responsibility
for infringing humanitarian law), requires the highest legal expertise.
The discursive and slow reconstruction, realized by the judges, of the
legal and moral reasoning seems different from the quick moral decision-making by the combatants on the battlefield. However, the processes might be similar and the difference exists, most probably, on the
level of supporting human cognitive architectures: conceptual rationality vs. high-speed intuitive/emotional abilities 105 (with learned skills acquired during long military drills). 106
In the following section we will examine the probable architecture
and mental processes in human soldiers applying the rules of LOAC on
the battlefield.
b) Modular organization of human mind
To understand the implementation efforts needed for AWS in com104. In relation to the balance of proportionality in legal thinking see generally Remus Titiriga, The ‘Jurisprudence of Interests’ (Interessenjurisprudenz) from Germany:
History, Accomplishments, Evaluation, 3.1 INT’L. J. L. LANGUAGE AND DISCOURSE 1
(2013); Robert Alexy, On Balancing and Subsumption: A Structural Comparison, 16 RATIO
JURIS 433 (2003); Alex Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943 (1987).
105. Psychological researches have shown that, during real time missions, the highly
trained experts, such as firefighters, do not take decisions by weighing alternatives, but
by moving forward and trying sequentially different hypotheses. See for further details
GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: HOW PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS (1998).
106. Hauser called this first form principled reasoning which is “slow, deliberate,
thoughtful, justifiable, requires considerable attention, appears late in development, justifiable, and open to carefully defended and principled counterclaims”. He also describe
ethical decisions with a different architectural design based upon intuitions which are
“fast, automatic, involuntary, require little attention, appear early in development, are
delivered in the absence of principled reasons, and often appear immune to counterreasoning”. MARC HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL SENSE
OF RIGHT AND WRONG (2006).
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plying with the rules of LOAC, one must identify, in the most general
way, the cognitive processes of human combatants applying these rules
on the battlefield. While certain aspects of the “general architecture” of
human mind are still mysterious, cognitive scientists are increasingly
recognizing its modular structure.107
At the most basic level, there are modules that humans share with
animals.
For
example,
certain
basic
forms
of
perception/belief/desire/planning/motor-control psychology are shared even
with invertebrates, such as insects108. Besides these common modules
there are certain components specifically human. It seems that humans
are unique (at least unique in the sophistication of these abilities) in
possessing twenty-two special mental capacities.109
Relatively little is known about ethical reasoning implied in the
production and control of behavior, although there are certain recent
advancements. We can try to make an educated guess about the human
mind modules needed to achieve these moral/legal abilities by combatants on the battlefield.
Since our purpose is to qualitatively identify the thresholds for creating artificial moral agents able to comply with LOAC, we will examine only the most important requisites—the discrimination and proportionality assessment abilities required of human combatants, fighting
on the most complex battlefield (i.e. urban combats against insurgents).
c) The cognitive modules (eventually) implied in
discrimination/distinction assessment by humans
Obviously, humans have the visual intelligence to differentiate the
elements of the environment, and have deep field awareness. But this
capability is just the first level of visual intelligence, the one that humans share with many animals (including certain invertebrates). Perceptual abilities and visual intelligence of insects, bees for example, are
quite impressive. They can distinguish between elements of their environment (flowers, members of the same hive, enemies, food, etc.) and
their visual intelligence is far greater than that of the most advanced
robots (such as Google’s car).
However, the discrimination/distinction requirements of LOAC
rules are even higher than that. For example, in certain circumstances,
one must distinguish between a combatant and a non-combatant (for
example, if insurgents pretend to be civilians). Added to this, the military must discriminate between active combatants and wounded ones
107. See generally, PETER CARRUTHERS, THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE MIND, OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS (2006).
108. See generally id.
109. See generally id.
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who are unable to fight or who have surrendered.110 This level of discrimination/distinction must involve specific human abilities and cognitive modules. The military must understand social interactions, the social cues, and deduce the intention of combatants and non combatants
(e.g. the surrender with a white flag).
At this level, two cognitive modules, specifically human, might become essential:
(1) the folk (physics capacity, enabling “deeper” causal reasoning of
physical phenomena);111 and (2) the mind (reading capacity (“theory of
mind”) which allows humans to attribute mental states to other people,
and to predict their probable actions.)112
d) The cognitive modules (eventually) implied in proportionality
assessment by humans
Proportionality of LOAC requires combatants to examine whether
the likely collateral damage of the attack would be excessive compared
to anticipated military advantage. As with the distinction, the judgment
of proportionality is highly dependent on the environment and the battlefield in which the military are deployed. Combatants need to imagine
or represent the alternative future outcomes and choose the one answering the requirements of proportionality. Intuitively speaking, the
human mind will use its unique episodic memory for a sort of “time
travel,” trying to represent different variants of the future and to choose
the best one. 113 Some of the following mental capacities/modules are required in proportionality-balancing reasoning: a capacity to entertain
suppositions used in counter-factual and hypothetical thinking (and also in mind-reading);114 within specific circumstances, there might be also a need for capacity to think creatively and generate novel ideas, novel hypotheses, and novel solutions to problems; and a capacity for
similarity-based and analogical thinking and reasoning, manifested in
human tendency to use one domain as a model for the operations of a
less-familiar system.115
110.

See generally PATRICK LIN, GEORGE BEKEY & KEITH ABNEY, AUTONOMOUS

MILITARY ROBOTICS: RISK, ETHICS, AND DESIGN

(Ethics Emerging Sciences Group at California Polytechnic State University, 1.0.9 ed. 2008).
111. Carruthers, supra note 49 at 156.
112. Id.
113. For a deep evaluation of the issue see THOMAS SUDDENDORF, THE GAP: THE
SCIENCE OF WHAT SEPARATES US FROM OTHER ANIMALS (2013).
114. As described in Carruthers, supra note 49 at 156.
115. That might also require a 10th module: “Normative capacities, containing components specialized for learning the social norms that are operative in one’s society, for
generating intrinsic (non-instrumental) motivation to comply with those norms, and for
generating a range of emotions in case of norm non-compliance (guilt, in one’s own case;
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4. THE LIMITATIONS FOR THE AUTONOMOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF
DISCRIMINATION AND PROPORTIONALITY ASSESSMENT WITHIN ROBOTS:
ESCAPE STRATEGIES

An autonomous weapon system complying with LOAC on the battlefield must match the relevant human abilities in relation to the cognitive modules described above. It seems that the implementation of
such performances (for discrimination or proportionality evaluations) in
autonomous weapon systems is unattainable by actual or by any future
AI technology. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, the AWS might
comply with LOAC only in very special and narrow circumstances, to be
explored bellow.
a) Discrimination
We have seen that, according to LOAC rules, military personnel
must distinguish a combatant from a non-combatant, even when, for
example, insurgents pretend to be civilians. The military must also
need to discriminate between active combatants and wounded ones who
are unable to fight or who have surrendered.
In the second part of the paper we discovered that the visual (perceptual) intelligence in state-of-the-art autonomous systems is not capable to distinguish the obstacles even at levels accessible for insects.
More importantly, we believe that the artificial emulation of the highest
level of human visual awareness (which uses cognitive modules like
folk-physics or folk-psychology in understanding complex interactions of
the physical and social world), is out of reach, even for AI technologies
of the distant future. This problem might be overcome by lowering the
threshold of discrimination by “simplifying” or “flattening” the complexity of a battlefield environment.
An early solution has been proposed by John Canning, an engineer
at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, who suggested 116 that unmanned
systems should target only the enemy weapons and not the enemies
themselves. According to him, one would have only the combat of machines (lethal robots) against other machines (robotic or not).
The proposal might work well for weapons such as tanks and other
vehicles that are operated only by human combatants. In other cases
(individual weapons for example), the proposal might not work since,
given the current or foreseeable limitations in AI, robots cannot reliably
target just the weapons and not persons, or cannot unfailingly differenanger and desires to punish, in the case of other people)[.]” Id. at 155.
116. John Canning, A Concept of Operations for Armed Autonomous Systems at the
Naval
Surface
Warfare
Center
(2006),
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2006disruptive_tech/canning.pdf
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tiate weapons from non-weapons.117
A more radical solution is to eliminate the need for discrimination
altogether, by acting autonomously with lethal force, only when civilians are absent of the battlefields. Combat robots might simply operate
only in regions of heavy fighting, crowded with valid targets 118 called
“kill boxes” or “engagement regions,” where the LOAC/ROE requirements are lowered since non-combatants can be realistically presumed
to have fled, thus avoiding the issue of discrimination among targets.
b) Proportionality
The proportionality requirements impose an even higher threshold
to AWS. In order to become truly autonomous, a weapons system must
emulate somewhat of an “imagination” (a representation faculty) that is
clearly out of reach of any AI technology. However, as for discrimination, one can remove the proportionality requirement altogether, by acting with autonomous robots only against machines (within the limited
circumstances analyzed above) or in the “kill boxes.”

GENERAL CONCLUSION
Based on developments from the second part of the paper, one may
conclude that during combat operations the autonomous robots would
face primarily two challenges: navigation of terrain with the addition of
ISR tasks. Cognitively speaking, terrain navigation and obstacle avoidance require pattern recognition and problem solving skills to be implemented autonomously in robots. And even stronger pattern recognition abilities are required during ISR missions.
While autonomous navigation and certain ISR tasks seem to be in
the reach of actual UMVs or future UAVs, the autonomous navigation
of UGVs seems unfeasible. This was the result of the inverse correlation
that we discovered, between attainable autonomy for such tasks and
the environment complexity in which robots are deployed. We have also
determined that the main technological bottleneck to actual autonomous robots is related to their poor “perceptive and/or visual intelligence.”
Based on this threshold, we assessed the technical perspectives for
autonomous implementation of lethal missions of military robots. We
have concluded that full autonomy of lethal missions is, by now, within
the reach of UMVs such as ACTUV (the hunter of diesel submarines).
117.
118.

Discussion reproduced in Lin, et. al., supra note 110 at 77.
Id, at 77.
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In the near future we might also see the appearance of UAVs/UCAVs
with self-defense abilities or with air-to-air and certain air-to-ground
attack abilities.
In the thirds part of the paper we analyzed another challenge, this
time only in relation to the autonomous implementation of lethal functions in robots: their “obligation” to fight in compliance with the rules of
LOAC/ROE. In order to be legally deployed, an autonomous lethal robot
must act on the battlefield like an autonomous moral agent and mimic
the high cognitive and moral evaluations of humans.119
We determined that the autonomous implementation of such human-mimetic moral abilities is out of reach to any current or far-future
AI technologies. This very high threshold will limit, for a long time, the
general lawful deployment of AWS, or will restrict their autonomous lethal use.
However, the environmental simplicity might play a role once
again. It might allow a legal deployment of AWS with (almost) no discrimination or proportionality assessment abilities, in circumstances
where civilians are absent from the battlefield—within the “kill zones,”
in machine counter machines combats, etc. Such particular simple battlefield environments might be found mostly in sea/undersea combat or
air combat.
In this respect, an UMV like ACTUV, provided with antisubmarine
attack capabilities (as a submarine destroyer), might be the first fully
operational AWS, complying, by default, with rules of LOAC/ ROE.
Other good candidates for implementing full lethal autonomy in robots, without infringing, by default, the LOAC/ ROE rules, are the
UCAVs in air-to-air or (specific) air-to-ground combat missions.
We have seen that all other types of autonomous robots, such as
UGV, will have very poor navigational abilities. The implementation of
ISR or lethal mission in such systems seems to be a technological barrier. Therefore, the problem of such systems complying with LOAC/ROE
rules will be, for long time, a purely philosophical question. That will
apply even more to UGVs having the shape of android robot-soldiers.
The specter of such Terminators coming into being as fighters will
haunt, maybe forever, only the nightmares of science fiction fans.

119.

TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6 at 16.
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FIGURES
FIGURE 1: AUTONOMY SPECTRUM AND THE OODA LOOP

FIGURE 2. AUTONOMY FRAME OF THE ARMY SCIENCE BOARD STUDY
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FIGURE 3. AUTONOMY LEVELS FOR UNMANNED SYSTEMS (ALFUS) MODEL
OF AUTONOMY
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